Device-to-device (D2D) communication is mainly launched by the transmission requirements between devices for specific applications such as proximity services in long-term evolution advanced networks, and each application will form a group of registered devices for the network-covered and network-absent D2D communications. During the applications of D2D communication, each device needs to identify the other devices of the same group in proximity by their group identity. This leads to the exposure of group information, by which the usage of applications can be analyzed by eavesdroppers. Hence, this paper introduces network-covered and network-absent authenticated key exchange protocols for D2D communications to guarantee accountable group anonymity, end-to-end security to network operators, as well as traceability and revocability for accounting and management requirements. We formally prove the security of those protocols, and also develop an analytic model to evaluate the quality of authentication protocols by authentication success rate in D2D communications. Besides, we implement the proposed protocols on android mobile devices to evaluate the computation costs of the protocols. We also evaluate the authentication success rate by the proposed analytic model and prove the correctness of the analytic model via simulation. Those evaluations show that the proposed protocols are feasible to the performance requirements of D2D communications.
consumption are challenges. Although LTE-A physicallayer provides even higher communication capability [1] , the resource allocation in the evolved universal terrestrial radio access network (E-UTRAN) to high density mobile devices remains dilemma when the resource is limited. The 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP) proposes D2D communication service in LTE-A, called Proximity Service (ProSe) [2] , [3] with three main purposes as follows: 1) the mobile network operator can offload traffic of E-UTRAN and Evolved Packet System (EPS) [4] , which is the core network (CN) of the LTE-A system; 2) D2D communication may support social network service, information sharing, advertising, gaming, and conferencing services; and 3) the high availability of D2D communication can be used to support public safety services. Besides, security is essential to support the correctness of the functions and the availability for D2D communications.
In ProSe, D2D communication can be classified as the network-covered and network-absent according to whether its control components are connected to CN (covered) or not (absent). The authenticated key exchange (AKE) in ProSe have to consider the connectivity between user equipments (UEs) and CN and should provide security protection from various kinds of attacks. Certain security threats have been discussed in [5] , i.e., eavesdropping between UEs, impersonation attack on UE or evolved NodeB (eNB), and active attack 1by injecting messages into traffic data or control data. AKE guarantees the identification by mutual authentication and confidentiality of communication by key exchange in computer networks [6] [7] [8] . Additionally, the anonymous protection to user identity is critical due to the broadcast nature of wireless communications. This security requirement has been carefully deliberated in [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . In mobile networks, an UE should complete authentication for identity identification in advance of requesting for services when roaming to a foreign network (FN). The user anonymous authentication prevents eavesdroppers or/and FN from disclosing the real identities of UEs in every authentication session, whereby the locations of UEs (i.e., footprints) may be tracked.
Anonymity can be divided as two levels, partial user anonymity and full user anonymity. Partial user anonymous authentication conceals identities from eavesdroppers, excluding FNs [9] [10] [11] and full user anonymous authentication additionally considers FNs as eavesdroppers [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] , [18] . In case of full user anonymity, traceability and revocability are essential to support the permitted network operators to trace and revoke user identities for management purposes. Certain traceability and revocability techniques [12] , [13] , [18] have been introduced to cancel the anonymity protection in secure wireless communications.
The aforementioned studies provide elegant solutions to support anonymous and secure wireless communication between users and networks. For D2D communications, two secure D2D communication systems [19] , [20] are proposed to support data sharing with distinct application scenarios. One [19] supports pseudonymity protection, where each real identity is replaced with a corresponding pseudo identity so that the sessions from the same device are traceable. The other [20] offers partial user anonymity, where system is able to trace the footprints of users.
Nevertheless, the new anonymity issue for the group information arises when direct communications between devices are launched for specific applications. In ProSe-enabled devices, the group is formed by devices using the same application. During the establishment of a D2D communication including device discovery procedure, the device, which initiates the D2D communication, needs to announce messages with an application identity so that it can be discovered by other devices in the same application group. Attackers may collect and analyze the application usage information and launch distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks to specific groups or observe the behaviors of users in proximity for malicious purposes. Hence, group anonymous protection with traceability should be considered in D2D communication to protect the application information included in the announcing message need to be protected while establishing D2D communications.
End-to-end security is another required security property as devices exchange messages via D2D communications. This security property prevents system operators, who help to establish D2D communications, from eavesdropping exchanging messages between devices.
Difference to Group-Oriented Communication: Broadcast encryption (BE) [21] and group key agreement (GKA) [22] are two well-studied primitives for secure group-oriented communications, which ensure a group of members sharing a common secret for communication protection. The BE allows a sender to broadcast an encrypted message and only the members of the specified subset can decrypt the message. The GKA allows members of a group to negotiate a common secret key or common public key parameters (each member shares different decryption key) publicly and exchange messages securely via the negotiated cryptographic keys. Both provide elaborate countermeasures for security needs of group-oriented communications. Wu et al. [23] further propose a hybrid primitive, the contributory broadcast encryption (ConBE) combing the notions of GKA and BE. In ConBE, every group member has to know the identities of the other group members, and the message sender has to know the identities of the selected receivers. Hence, BE, GKA, and ConBE have to know the identities of members either for encryption or key agreement, which contradicts the assumption of group anonymous D2D communications, considered in this paper. For group anonymous and accountable D2D communications, both participant UEs should not know the identity and group information of each other.
Security Difference: Compared to wireless communication, D2D communications additionally consider entity authentication without involving security infrastructure (i.e., authentication server), privacy protection against network infrastructure, group anonymity preventing from exposing group or application related identity, and end-to-end security among devices.
A. Contributions
This work presents two group anonymous authenticated key exchange protocols for network-covered and networkabsent D2D communications in mobile networks to support identity and group (application) anonymity, accountability (i.e.,traceability and revocability), and end-to-end security against insider attacker (between devices). Specifically, we first propose the group-anonymous D2D communication with CN-assistance (CN-GD2C) protocol adopting identity-based encryption (IBE) against chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), Diffie-Hellman key exchange, symmetry-based encryption, and hash functions. We also propose the group-anonymous authenticated key exchange for network-absent D2D communication (NA-GD2C) protocol by utilizing the new proposed identity-based k-anonymity secret handshake scheme with the encryptions and proof technique by combining public-key encryptions (key-private encryption and Linear encryption) and zero-knowledge proof in the design. We then formally prove the security of these two protocols and develop an analytic model using queueing theory to evaluate authentication success rates of the proposed protocols and demonstrate the scalability and efficiency of the proposed protocols. We also implement the proposed protocols to estimate the computation costs on mobile devices, and obtain the authentication success rates by both simulation and analytic model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the system and security models of D2D communication in mobile networks. In Section III, we present the building blocks of the proposed protocols. In Section IV, we propose group anonymous D2D communication protocols of network-covered and network-absent cases. The security analysis and performance evaluation on the proposed protocols are presented in Section V and Section VI, respectively. Finally, we conclude this work in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM AND SECURITY MODELS
This section introduces the system model including the functions of the system components and the operating procedures for secure D2D communications in ProSe [24] , [25] . We then introduce the behaviors of the attackers, and propose the security model and its definitions of the proposed system.
A. System Model and Security Requirements
1) The System Model: In ProSe, there are two kinds of UEs, announcing UE (A-UE), who requests for establishing D2D communication, and monitoring UE (M-UE), who monitors the requests of D2D communications in proximity. In network-covered D2D communications, each UE shares long-term secret with authentication center/home subscriber server (AuC/HSS), which is response for the user subscription management, user authentication and session key management. When UEs establish D2D communication for ProSe, they can be either inside or outside of the coverage of CN. Each UE can access E-UTRAN via eNB in its coverage. Before establishing D2D communication, each A-UE and M-UE need to register to ProSe function to obtain the required parameters for D2D communication configuration.
In network-covered D2D communications, both A-UE and M-UE attach to CN for device discovery procedure with authentication and authorization. During a device discovery, the ProSe function will send authentication requests to AuC/HSS to authenticate participant devices. Once authentication requests are received, HSS/AuC will produce the corresponding authentication token for ProSe function to authenticate the UEs. By the aforesaid parameters from ProSe function, the A-UE can announce device discovery messages and be discovered by the M-UEs of the same application groups.
In network-absent D2D communications, HSS/AuC assigns each UE an identity with the corresponding private key of an IBE system for secure D2D communication. The identity is valid for a pre-defined duration and can be revoked as required. In both communication modes, the application identity of each UE for services are maintained by ProSe function.
2) The Security Requirements: According to the system model, we analyze and propose the following security requirements that are urgently required in D2D communications.
• Authenticated Key Exchanged With End-to-End Security: This is to guarantee the authentication of intended participants and confidentiality of the transmission between two UEs in ProSe. Typically, two parties achieve authenticated key exchange (AKE) with end-to-end secure communication based on a long-term secret only known by them. However, UEs only share long-term secret key with the HSS/AuC located in CN. Hence, AKE between two UEs needs the participation of the HSS/AuC and this leads the exchanged session key between two UEs will be known by the HSS/AuC. Namely, the communication between two UEs will be exposed to the CN. In the sense of D2D communications, communication confidentiality between two UEs should be guaranteed. Hence, ProSe needs to achieve authenticated key exchange with end-toend security between two UEs. • Identity and Group Anonymity: Identity anonymity is to guarantee that the identities of the participants in each AKE session are protected and cannot be linked between sessions to prevent outsider attackers from tracing the footprints of the participants. Besides that, group anonymity is also essential in ProSe since the usage of applications of UEs in ProSe is considered as sensitive information, which may be analyzed and utilized for disturbing services. Only two UEs in the same application group can successfully authenticate each other and exchange a session key. If two UEs belong to different groups, they are unable to learn identity and group information of each other in authentication [26] . Obviously, AKE with group anonymity also guarantees identity anonymity. • Traceability and Revocability: Traceability in group anonymous authentication guarantees the identity and group information of participants in every successful authentication session can be disclosed when the identities of UEs in ProSe are required for management or accounting purposes by CN. Only authorized entity, e.g., HSS/AuC or ProSe, can disclose the group and identity information. Revocability ensures the identity of every UE can be revoked to terminate D2D services. Fig. 1 shows the attacker model of ProSe. An outsider attacker may eavesdrop the communications including the exchanged messages, the identity information, or the group information, between two UEs. It may break the confidentiality of communications, trace the footprints of UEs, or probe the using applications according to the group information. The outsider attacker may also impersonate as a legal user to pass the authentication and exchange a common session key with any legal user. Furthermore, a legal user can be an attacker to achieve mutual authentication and exchange a common session key with any user belonging to different group. Additionally, the ProSe function or HSS/AuC can be system attackers, who eavesdrop the exchanged messages between devices in D2D communications. This kind of attacker is commonly not considered by the security solutions in mobile networks. However, it makes sense to consider secure communication against the system attackers as the messages are merely exchanged between devices in D2D communications. Before defining the attackers, we define an authenticated key exchange protocol and the capabilities of attackers in the protocol as follows.
B. Security Models and Definitions
The proposed protocol is , and t 1 U,V and t 2 V ,U are regarded as two instances to model two users U and V being the partners of each other in the communication session t 1 and t 2 of . We say that a matching conversation involving t 1 U,V and t 2 V ,U if and only if t 1 = t 2 and U and V are partners. The capability of an attacker can be captured by the following oracles.
• Execute( t 1 U,V , t 2 V ,U ): This oracle models a passive attacker, who can intercept all communications between
This oracle models an active attacker, who sends a message m to t 1 U,V . • Reveal( t 1 U,V ): This oracle models the exposure of the accepted session key of U shared with its partner V in the session t 1 .
This oracle models the exposure of the long-term secret key of U during the session t 1 with its partner V .
When an attacker queries this oracle, it will return a real session key, accepted by U with its partner V in the session t 1 , or a random string according to a random bit if the negotiation of the session key is complete. The query of this oracle is failed, if the session key is not negotiated.
When an attacker queries this oracle, it will return the real identity of U or a random string according to a random bit when U and V are accepted each other with a negotiated session key. The query of this oracle is failed, if the AKE is not fulfilled between U and V . • TestGroup( t 1 U,V ): When an attacker queries this oracle, it will return the group information of U or a random string according to a random bit when U and V are accepted each other with a negotiated session key. The query of this oracle is failed, if the AKE is not fulfilled between U and V . We then define the security of AKE in ProSe according to the discussed security requirements as follows.
Definition 1 (Mutul Authentication): There are a simulator S, who simulates t 1 U,V or t 2 V ,U by , and a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) attacker A of , who can query Execute and Send in polynomial time. After oracle queries, A sends a message to be accepted by t 1 U,V or t 2 V ,U with the advantage as follows:
The mutual authentication security of is guaranteed for U and V if 1) t 1 U,V and t 2 V ,U has a matching conversation with and are accepted by each other and 2) Adv MA A is negligible.
Definition 2 (Key Exchange Against System Operator):
S simulates t 1 U,V and t 2 U,V by to interact with A, who is either an outsider attacker or a system attacker (i.e., HSS/AuC or ProSe function), and can query Execute and Send in polynomial time. After oracle queries, t 1 U,V and t 2 V ,U are accepted by each other with an exchanged session key K U,V . A queries Test to obtain K U,V or a random string from t 1 U,V or t 2 V ,U according to a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
Succ SK A denotes the event that A outputs a guess b = b. Then, the advantage of A of distinguishing the session key from a random string is defined as
If Adv SK A is negligible, we say achieves session key security.
Definition 3 (Identity Anonymity): S simulates t 1 U,V and t 2 U,V by interacting with A, and A can query Execute and Send in polynomial time. After oracle queries, t 1 U,V and t 2 V ,U are accepted by each other, A queries TestID to obtain ID U or ID V , or a random string from t 1 U,V or t 2 V ,U according to a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Succ anon_id A denotes the event that A outputs a guess b = b. Then, the advantage of A for identity anonymity is defined as
If Adv anon_id A is negligible, we say achieves identity anonymity.
Definition 4 (Group Anonymity): The security of group anonymity is similar to that of identity anonymity. Instead, A queries TestGroup to obtain the group information or a random string from
If Adv anon_group A is negligible, we say achieves group anonymity.
III. BUILDING BLOCKS
This section introduces the required building blocks of two group anonymous AKE protocols for network-covered and network-absent D2D communications.
A. Bilinear Groups
We first define the used bilinear map operation [27] [28] [29] [30] . The bilinear maps is defined as e : G 1 × G 2 → G T , where all group G 1 , G 2 , and G T are multiplicative and of prime order p. When g 1 is a generator of G 1 and g 2 is a generator of G 2 , there exists a computable isomorphism ψ from G 2 to G 1 such as ψ(g 1 ) = g 1 . The map e has the following properties:
B. Pseudorandom Function and Permutation
We consider keyed hash, e.g., SHA-256, and symmetric encryption, e.g., AES, as pseudorandom function and permutation, respectively, in our proposed protocols. Their security definitions are given as follows.
Definition 5 (Pseudorandom Function Security): We say that H : K H × X → Y is a secure pseudorandom function [31] if any PPT adversary A in distinguishing H from any given truly random function is with the following negligible advantage
where Succ PRF A is the event that A distinguishes H from the given truly random function successfully by observing the outputs of the function, K H is the key space, X ⊆ {0, 1} l 1 is the input space, Y ⊆ {0, 1} l 2 is the output space, and l 1 > l 2 .
Definition 6 (Pseudorandom Permutation Security): We say that G : K G × X → X is a secure pseudorandom permutation [32] if any PPT A in distinguishing G from any given truly random permutation is with the following negligible advantage
where Succ PRP A is the event that A distinguishes G from the given truly random permutation successfully by observing the outputs of the permutation, K G is the key space, X ⊆ {0, 1} l is the input space, and X ⊆ {0, 1} l is the output space.
C. Identity-Based Encryption
The concept of identity-based encryption (IBE) is to eliminate the management costs of user certificates, i.e., verifying its correctness and its revocation. A usable IBE is first proposed by Boneh and Franklin [33] (BF-IBE) with IND-CPA in a random oracle model. It consists of four algorithms as follows.
• Setup: This algorithm is given a security parameter κ to generate a prime p and two bilinear groups G and G T such that a bilinear map e : G × G → G T holds. It then chooses a random generator g ∈ G, sets G pub = g s for a randomly selected s ∈ Z p , and chooses two cryptographic hash functions, H 1 : {0, 1} * → G * and H 2 : G T → {0, 1} n for some n. The message space is M = {0, 1} n and the ciphertext space is C = G * × {0, 1} n . The system parameters are param = { p, G, G T , e, n, g, G pub , H 1 , H 2 } and the master key of the system is msk = s. • Extract: This algorithm is given an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * and computes the corresponding private key d ID = Q s ID , where Q ID = H 1 (ID) ∈ G * . • Encrypt: Given a message M ∈ M and the identity ID as the public key, this algorithm encrypts the message
Given a ciphertext C encrypted by ID and the private key d ID , the algorithm decrypts the message by
Security of IBE:
The notion of ciphertext indistinguishability for the security of public-key encryption has been introduced to make an attacker obtain no information of the plaintext from a given ciphertext [34] . A stronger security notion of IND-CPA is proposed to satisfy the security requirement of secure communication [35] , where the attacker can decrypt any chosen ciphertexts other than the target ciphertext.
An IBE is IND-CPA secure if the advantage of any PPT adversary, A, in the following game is negligible: 1) A issues m queries for the private keys d ID i 1 , . . . , d ID im of ID i 1 , . . . , ID i m ; 2) A may make polynomial number of queries to a decryption oracle to obtain the corresponding plaintexts of the chosen ciphertext C i with ID i ; 3) A outputs two chosen messages (M 1 , M 2 ) and the target identity, which is not queried for the private key, and is given a challenge ciphertext C * = Encrypt(param, ID * , M b ) on message M b according to a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}; 4) A makes another polynomial number of queries to extract the private keys of the given identities (Restriction: The queried identites should be different from ID * ); and 5) eventually, A outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Succ IBE A denotes the event that A outputs b = b successfully. The advantage of A of IBE security is defined as
D. Group Anonymity by k-Anonymous Secret Handshakes With Constant Communication Costs
By the proposed k-anonymous secret handshakes (SH), we can build a group anonymous authentication based on it. The k-anonymous SH achieves adjustable group anonymous authentication where the adversary exists with the probability of 1 k to identify the group information of given user pairs [36] . Moreover, the k-anonymous SH enjoys the property of revocability since it utilizes user certificates, which are reusable and can be revoked by announcing certificate revocation list (CRL). Compared to the unlinkable secret handshakes [37] by group signatures and group key agreement, k-anonymous SH needs less computation costs. SH supports each user to authenticate to the others according to the possessed group information but not identity information [26] , [36] , [38] . Namely, each user belonging to a group can only successfully authenticate to the other users in the same group. Otherwise, the authentication process does not leak any information to the counterpart or eavesdroppers who do not belong to the same group.
However,the communication costs of k-anonymous SH is linear to the anonymity degree, i.e., k, for exchanging the public keys of selected user pairs in the protocol. Hence, this work shows an enhancement for k-anonymous SH. Instead of transmitting the selected group and user index information, we compress the selected group and user indices into variables and decompress the variables to recover the group and user indices as the following functions.
By gSelect, w groups are randomly selected from G 1 to G w , respectively, and the information of the selected groups is compressed as θ 1 and σ g . The selected groups can be recovered by gSelectVer. By uSelect, w users are randomly selected from the givenḠ, where each user is selected from distinctḠ z sz for z ∈ [0, w − 1]. The user information is compressed as θ 2 and σ u . The selected users can be recovered by uSelectVer.
With these four functions, the k-anonymous SH ensures constant communication costs for exchanging group and user indices in authentication protocol. Hence, we will introduce how to design a group anonymous AKE for network-absent D2D communication with them in Section IV.
E. Proof on Dual Encryptions
To support traceability of the group anonymous AKE in network-absent D2D communications, we will adopt the concept of proof on dual encryptions. The transcripts of each authentication session is anonymous to the outsiders, including ProSe function, as group anonymity is guaranteed. We leave a trapdoor for the ProSe function to open the messages of the session by encrypting the message in a session with the public key of each participant device and the public key of ProSe function and proving the encryptions on the same messages. Before introducing the proof on dual encryptions, we introduce two encryption algorithms, i.e., key-private and Linear publickey encryptions. The procedures of key-private encryption are as follows: 1) the public key and the private key of a user are given by pk = (g, p, X) and sk = (g, p, x), respectively, and 2) the ciphertext of the key-private encryption on a message
The Linear encryption [27] is underlaid on the decision linear problem and shown as follows: 1) the public key and the private key of T are given by pk = (u, v, h) and sk = (x,ŷ), respectively, and 2) the ciphertext of the linear encryption on a message M becomes
. One can decrypt the message by M =Ĉ/ Tx 1 · Tŷ 2 . The proof of dual encryptions, i.e., the key-private encryption and the linear encryption, and its verification can be done as the following two algorithms.
• EncProof(C 1 , C 2 , β 1 , β 2 , y): First, the prover randomly selects r β 1 , r β 2 , and r y , and computes R 1 = u r β 1 , R 2 = v r β 2 , and R 3 = e(h, g) r β 1 +r β 2 · e(X, g) −r y . Then it computes c = H(C 1 , C 2 , R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , T 1 , T 2 , X) and s β 1 = r β 1 + cβ 1 , s β 2 = r β 2 + cβ 2 , and s y = r y + cy. After that, the prover outputs (c, s β 1 , s β 2 , s y , R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ) as the proof to the verifier.
The verifier then checks if C 1 and C 2 are the ciphertexts on the same plaintext by
If the equations hold, the ciphertexts produced by the prover are the encryptions on the same plaintext, and this algorithm outputs true or false otherwise.
IV. PROPOSED GROUP ANONYMOUS D2D COMMUNICATIONS
In this section, we propose two group anonymous schemes including the main building blocks for network-covered and network-absent cases.
A. Key Management and User Registration
The key management of the proposed GRAAD inherits the key management of the conventional security architecture of LTE, where each UE i shares a long-term secret key K i with HSS/AuC after registration. In addition, the key management on UEs, ProSe function, and HSS/AuC for the security of ProSe is considered as shown in Fig. 2 . On HSS/AuC, the real identity ID i , the corresponding application identity AID i and the shared secret K i of each UE are stored. Additionally, the HSS/AuC generates a master secret key, msk = s, for randomly selected s ∈ Z p and the corresponding public parameters, param, by Setup (as introduced in Sec. III-C) to build an BF-IBE system. On the ProSe function, AID i and the corresponding group identity GID i of each UE are managed. An application authentication key AK i is shared with the ProSe function and each UE i of the corresponding AID i . Besides that, the ProSe function is associated a unique secret key K p and generates a public/private key pair of Linear encryption as { pk P = (u, v, h), sk P = (x,ŷ)}. HSS/AuC issues each UE i a BF-IBE user private key
B. Group Anonymous AKE for Network-Covered D2D Communication (CN-GD2C)
The notations are introduced in Table I and the key management is introduced in Sec. IV-A for the proposed protocol. The details of the proposed CN-GD2C protocol are as follows.
1) After negotiating the parameters for D2D communication, UE i randomly selects a session identity si d ∈ Z p and (x i , r ) ∈ Z 2 p . It then computes X = g x i , δ i = H(AK i ⊕ si d) and E i = {g r , ID i ⊕ H 2 (g r TID i )} and send them to UE j , where TID i = δ i ||X ||si d and E i is the BF-IBE ciphertext. 2) UE 2 keeps X and computes Y = g y j , δ j = H(AK j ⊕ si d), and E j = {g r , ID j ⊕ H 2 (g r TID j )} with randomly selected y j , r , where TID j = δ j ||Y||si d and E j is the BF-IBE ciphertext. It then sends si d, δ i , δ j , E i , E j , X , Y to HSS/AuC via eNB.
3) The HSS/AuC first decrypts E i and E j by
where TID i = δ i ||X ||si d and TID j = δ j ||Y||si d. d TID i and d TID j can be produced by the HSS/AuC with msk. The HSS/AuC then finds the corresponding application identities AID i and AID j of ID i and ID j and sends si d, δ i , δ j , AID i , AID j to the ProSe function.
The ProSe function first checks if δ i = H (AK i ⊕ si d) and δ j = H (AK j ⊕ si d) according to the given AID i and AID j . It then checks the group information of both UEs. If G(AID i ) = G(AID j ), then the ProSe function computes ack i = H(AK i ⊕ si d ⊕ true) and ack j = H(AK j ⊕si d ⊕true), where G(AID) returns the belonging group of AID and AK i = AID i ⊕ GID i ⊕ K P . Once received si d, ack i , ack j , and true, the HSS/AuC confirms AID i and AID i belong to the same group and sends E i = E S (K i , ack i ||(si d ⊕ R)) and E j = E S (K j , ack j ||(si d ⊕ R)) to UE j . 4) UE j first decrypts E i with K i to obtain ack i || (si d ⊕ R) and verify ack i
. 
and verify ack j the same as the previous step. Then, and X RE S j = H(K j , si d) to UE j , and UE j forwards X RE S i to UE i . UE i and UE j accept the authenticated key exchange session for the following D2D communication between them according the verification on X RE S i and X RE S j . Finally, UE i and UE j computes the same session key by K i j = Y x i = g y j ·x i = X y j = g x i ·y j , respectively.
C. Group-Anonymous AKE for Network-Absent D2D Communication (NA-GD2C)
This section presents a group anonymous AKE for networkabsent D2D communication (NA-GD2C) protocol with traceability, where only two devices are involved in the protocol. Specifically, the objective of NA-GD2C protocol is to conceal the group information of both devices from outsiders and CN, except for a trusted authority that is granted to reveal the group information of users and not a part of CN. As the dispute is arisen in a session, designated authorities, i.e., ProSe function and HSS/AuC, can engage to trace the identities of the originators. Nonetheless, the identity of every UE is revocable by announcing the revoked identities in the system. The NA-GD2C protocol achieves the aforesaid goals based on the techniques of k-anonymous secret handshakes, identitybased encryption, and non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. 1) Proposed NA-GD2C Protocol: Let us consider n UEs, U = {UE 1 , . . . , UE n }, that belong to m different application groups, G = {G 1 , . . . , G m }, in D2D communication. For UE i with an assigned identity ID i , the identity-based user private key d ID i is issued by HSS/AuC as introduced in Sec. IV-A. Additionally, ID i generates a public/private key pair, ( pk i , sk i ), of key-private public key encryption as introduced in Sec. III-E. Each UE belongs to one group only, and G(UE i ) = G j means the belonging group of UE i is G j for all i ∈ [1, n] and j ∈ [1, m].
We consider two UEs, an UE U ∈ U belongs to the group G(UE U ) = G i s i and an UE V ∈ U belongs to the group G(UE V ) = G j s j . While UE U and UE V establish D2D communication, they should first authenticate each other to check whether they are legal users and belong to the same group. The protocol of proposed group-anonymous D2D communication is shown in Fig. 3 and described as follows.
1) In the beginning, UE U and UE V negotiate the parameters of D2D communication and exchange two random numbers N U and N V selected by them, respectively. Afterwards, UE U generates θ 1 , θ 2 , σ g , and σ u by (θ 1 , σ g ) ← gSelect(G, UE U , w, N U , N V ) and (θ 2 , σ u ) ← uSelect(Ḡ, UE U , w, N U , N V ) and sends them to UE V , where gSelect and uSelect are introduced in Sec. III-D. 2) UE V generates (s 0 , . . . , s w−1 ) ← gSelectVer(Ḡ, w, N u ,
, and encrypts a randomly selected δ ∈ Z p and pk V as
, and encrypts a randomly selected γ ∈ Z p and pk U as
to obtain δ and pk V . Afterwards, UE U computes σ 0 = f 0 (γ , δ ) and encrypts γ with pk P and pk U , sk U as
and γ ||i U
If so, it accepts UE U belonging to its group and computes σ 1 = f 0 (γ , δ, 1),
If so, it accepts UE V belonging to its group and computes σ 2 = f 0 (γ , δ , 2). UE U sends σ 2 to UE V . UE V then checks the correctness of σ 2 and stores it. Finally, UE U and UE V share the same session key K U,V = f 0 (γ , δ, 3).
D. NA-GD2C With Traceability
In case of dispute or management requirement,
, and σ 1 , σ 2 to the ProSe function to prove the participation of UE U and UE V in the specified D2D communication session as follows. The ProSe function first checks the correctness of (C 1,U , C 2,U , C 1,V , C 2,V ) by EncVer with (π U , π V ) as in Sec. III-E. It then decrypts C 2,U and C 2,V to obtain γ and δ byĈ U /(Tx 1,U · Tŷ 2,U ) andĈ V /(Tx 1,V · Tŷ 2,V ) to verify σ 0 , σ 1 or σ 2 .
E. Membership Management
The membership of the proposed two protocols can be managed as follows. For CN-GD2C, once any member of an application group joins or leaves, the HSS/AuC and ProSe function will update the membership information. Since every authentication needs to interact with HSS/AuC and ProSe function, each membership update will immediately take effect in the following D2D authentication sessions. For NA-GD2C, every authentication uses the identities of UEs in different application groups. Hence, HSS/AuC will issue the corresponding user private key for each new UE, and revoke the identities of revoked UEs and list them on the revocation list in public. In summary, the costs of membership maintenance are both constants for CN-GD2C and NA-GD2C regardless of the number of groups and UEs in the system.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove the security of the proposed protocols based on the security definition in Sec. II-B.
A. Security Analysis of CN-GD2C Protocol
In the network-covered D2D communications, traceability and revocability are readily guaranteed as all communications of UEs are performed under the control of CN. Hence, we prove that the proposed CN-GD2C protocol achieves the mutual authentication, secure key exchange for end-to-end security, and identity and group anonymity as follows.
Theorem 1 (CN-GD2C Security) : The proposed CN-GD2C protocol is said to be a group anonymous (including identity anonymous) authenticated key exchange protocol if H is a pseudorandom function, E S is a pseudorandom permutation, and BF-IBE is a IND-CPA-secure identity-based encryption scheme. Then, we have that
where Adv CN-GD2C A is the advantage of breaking the CN-GD2C protocol security, Adv E S is the advantage of breaking pesudorandom permutation security, Adv H is the advantage of breaking pseudorandom function security, Adv DDH is the advantage of breaking DDH assumption, and Adv IND-CPA is the advantage of breaking IND-CPA security of BF-IBE.
Proof: Let A be an adversary of breaking the security of mutual authentication, key exchange, and identity and group anonymity of the proposed CN-GD2C. The proof proceeds via a sequence of security games, G 0 , G 1 , G 2 , G 3 , and G 4 . We will claim the advantage of A in CN-GD2C is negligible based on the advantages of A in the following games. We denote Adv CN-GD2C
A,i as the advantage of A in game G i . Game G 0 : This is the real game and A is given the access to the public parameters of BF-IBE param, all {AID i } i=0,1,... and {UID i } i=0,1,... . The A is also allowed to query all oracles specified in Sec.II. The param can be simulated successfully as BF-IBE is proven to be IND-CPA secure with the success of simulating params. Hence, we have
Game G 1 (Mutual Authentication): In the game G 1 , we change the game as follows. E 1 and E 2 are the events that A successfully impersonates the HSS/AuC by sending a verifiable E i and E j , respectively. E 3 and E 4 are the event that A successfully impersonates UE i or UE j by sending a correct R E S i or R E S j , respectively. E 5 and E 6 are the events that A impersonates HSS/AuC by sending X RE S i or X RE S j , accepted by UE i or UE j , respectively. If E 1 happens, we can also breaking the security of pseudorandom permutation by constructing a simulator B of CN-GD2C interacting with A as the security game defined in Definition 1. Hence, we have that
where S E S is the event of distinguishing a pseudorandom function from a truly random function successfully, ¬E 1 is the complementary event of E 1 , 1 Adv E 1 is the advantage of E 1 , which is the probability of sending out a valid E i . 
Game G 2 (Key Exchange): In the game G 2 , we change the game as follows. We replace X , Y, and K i j with a Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) tuple (X = g x , Y = g y , Z = g z ), where z = x y or z is a random element depending on a random bit. Then, we can construct a simulator B 2 interacting with A for the key exchange game as defined in Definition 2. Once A queries Test, B 2 either outputs K i j = Z or a random string. B has only the advantage to distinguish DDH tuple for breaking DDH assumption under the successful guess of K i j . We have that
where S DDH is the event of distinguishing DDH tuple from random element successfully, WIN 2 is the event that distinguishing the session key K i j from random string with additional advantage, Adv DDH is the advantage of breaking DDH assumption, and Adv KE is the advantage of breaking key exchange security. Hence, we have that
Game G 3 (Identity Anonymity): In the game G 3 , we create a simulator B 3 to simulate CN-GD2C by giving the public parameters params of BF-IBE. The encryptions of ID i and ID j can therefore be produced overwhelmingly. B 3 then plays the security game defined in Definition 3 with A. In the security game, A is allowed to call all defined queries in the definitions. After the interaction, A calls TestID and B 3 responds a truly ID i or a random string according a random bit. If A can successfully guess out, then B 3 can exploit the answer to break IND-CPA security of BF-IBE as follows.
where S IND-CPA is the event of winning IND-CPA security game of BF-IBE, WIN 3 is the event that distinguishing the identity ID i from random string with additional advantage, Adv IND-CPA is the advantage of breaking IND-CPA security of BF-IBE, and Adv ID-anon is the advantage of breaking identity anonymity. Since A can break the identity anonymity on ID i or ID j , we have
Note that Adv ID-anon being negligible only ensures that the advantage of distinguishing identity from a random string is negligible. In the proposed CN-GD2C, each protected identity (i.e., anonymous identity) can be authenticated, and attacks of identity modification can be detected. This is because the CN-GD2C achieves both mutual authentication and identity anonymity, which have been proven in Games G 1 and G 3 . Hence, identity modification attacks can be detected. Game G 4 (Group Anonymity): In the game G 4 , we change the game as follows. We construct a simulator B 4 to simulator the CN-GD2C interacting with A, as the security game defined in Definition 4, to break the security of pseudorandom function H, which is used to calculate ack i and ack j in the protocol. If A can send the correct ack i or ack j , the security of group anonymity is also broken as the group information is confirmed with them by ProSe function. B 4 is able to exploit A with the advantage of breaking the group anonymity to break the pseduorandom function security with additional advantage as follows.
where S H is the event that breaking pseudorandom function security with additional advantage, WIN 4 is the event that distinguishing the group information G(AID i ) or G(AID j ) from random string with additional advantage, and Adv group-anon is the advantage of breaking group anonymity. Since A can break the group anonymity by distinguishing the group information of either ID i or ID j , we have
Besides the advantages analyzed by the above games, there is no additional advantage of G 4 . Hence, from (10), (12) , (14) , and (16), we conclude the advantage of A to the proposed CN-GD2C is
The advantage of breaking the proposed CN-GD2C is bounded by the advantages of breaking the security of the fundamental security primitives, i.e., pseudorandom function, pseudorandom permutation, IND-CPA-secure BF-IBE, and DDH assumption.
B. Security Analysis of NA-GD2C Protocol
In this section, we prove that the proposed NA-GD2C protocol achieves the mutual authentication, secure key exchange (for end-to-end security), group anonymity, and traceability and revocability.
Theorem 2 (NA-GD2C Security): The proposed NA-GD2C protocol is said to be a group anonymous (including identity anonymous) authenticated key exchange protocol with traceability if the improved k-anonymous SH scheme is proven to be secure, and BF-IBE is IND-CPA secure, and Linear encryption and key-private encryption are semantic secure. Then, we have that
where Adv NA-GD2C
A is the advantage of breaking the NA-GD2C protocol security, Adv f 0 is the advantage of breaking the pseudorandom function, f 0 , assumption, Adv k−SH is the advantage of breaking k-anonymous SH security, Adv LIN is the advantage of breaking the semantic security of Linear encryption, and Adv KP is the advantage of breaking the semantic security of key private encryption.
Proof: Let A be an adversary, who breaks the security of mutual authentication, key exchange, identity and group anonymity, and traceability of the proposed NA-GD2C. This proof proceeds via a sequence of games, G 0 , G 1 , G 2 , G 3 , G 4 , and G 5 . We shows that the advantage of A in NA-GD2C is bound to the advantages of breaking the security of the underlying primitives. Let Adv NA-GD2C
A,i denote the advantage of A in game G i .
Game G 0 : This is the real game of NA-GD2C and A is given the access to all user and group identities, the public parameters of BF-IBE, and the public keys of Linear and key private encryptions, which are used in the protocol. The A is also allowed to query the defined oracles in Sec. II. Hence, we have that Adv NA-GD2C
Game G 1 (Mutual Authentication -Part I):
In the game G 1 , we change the game by replacing the public parameters of BF-IBE with the one given by the challenger of IND-CPA security of BF-IBE. We then constructs a simulator B 1 to simulate the proposed CN-GD2C to interact with A. If A can send E V or E U , which can be decrypted, with additional advantage, then B 1 can also exploit the advantage of A to break the IND-CPA security of BF-IBE as follows.
where WIN 1 is the event of sending out correct E U or E V successfully and Adv MA 1 is the advantage of A in game G 1 .
Since A can win in the game G 1 by either sending out E U or E V , we have that
Game G 2 (Mutual Authentication -Part II): In game G 2 , we change the game by replacing f 0 with a pseudorandom function or a truly random function. We have that
where WIN 2 is the event of sending out a correct σ 0 or σ 1 successfully and Adv MA 2 is the advantage of A in game G 2 . Hence, we have
Game G 3 (Key Exchange): In the game G 3 , we replace f 0 for generating K U,V with a pseudorandom or truly random function. We then construct a simulator B 3 to simulate the proposed NA-GD2C and play the security game of key exchange as defined in Sec. II with A. If A wins the security game by distinguishing a true session key from a random string, B 3 can then exploit the advantage of A to break the pesudorandom function assumption as follows.
where WIN 3 is the event of distinguishing the true session key from a random string with additional advantage by A and Adv KE is the advantage of breaking the key exchange security by A in game G 3 . From the above, we have that
Game G 4 
where Adv k−SH is the advantage of breaking k-SH scheme, WIN 4 is the event of distinguishing user or group identity from a random string by A successfully, and Adv ID-G-anon is the advantage of distinguishing the real user or group identity by A. Hence, we have that
Game G 5 (Identity and Group Anonymity -Part II): In the game G 5 , we replace H used in uSelect, gSelect, uSelectVer, and gSelectVer with a pseudorandom function or a truly random function depending on a random bit. If A can send out a valid σ u , σ g , or σ u even A is not in the same group as the simulated participant, then the simulator can exploit the advantage of A to break the pseudorandom function assumption as follows.
where WIN 5 is the event of sending a valid σ u , σ g , or σ u by A and Adv ID-G-anon-2 is the advantage of sending a valid σ u , σ g , or σ u by A. Hence, we have that
Game G 6 (Traceability): In the game G 6 , we change the game as follows. We construct an algorithm B 6 to simulate the functions EncProof and EncVer to interact with A as follows. The security of traceability has to consider two kinds of adversaries: 1) the one who may produce a false proof on two encryptions of different messages and 2) the one who may produce a new proof, different from the original proof, without the random secrets α, β, and x. The security of traceability of NA-GD2C consists of two security properties as follows.
1) Zero knowledge: One can prove that the prover in possession of the trapdoor can produce a false proof to prove C andĈ are the encryptions of the same message even if they are the encryptions of different messages as follows. The prover computes R 3 = e(h, g) r α +r β · e(Y, g) −r x · e( M 2 M 1 , g) c and outputs c as the hash value while the input of the controlled random oracle H is
where M 1 and M 2 are the messages of C 1 and C 2 , respectively. Hence, c is considered as a random number generated by a secure hash function. The security of zero-knowledge is to prevent any adversary from generating a proof on two encryptions of different messages. 
and
where WIN 6 is the event of sending another valid proof by A and Adv Tr is the advantage of sending another valid proof to break the traceability of NA-GD2C by A. Hence, we have
Besides the advantages analyzed by the above games, there is no additional advantage of G 6 . Hence, we conclude that the advantage of A to the proposed CN-GD2C is as follows.
The advantage of breaking the proposed NA-GD2C is bounded by the advantages of breaking the security of the fundamental security primitives, i.e., pseudorandom function, IND-CPA-secure BF-IBE, k-anonymous SH, Linear encryption, and key-private encryption.
VI. COMPARISONS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we compare the security properties of this work with two related works [19] , [20] , and analyze and evaluate the computation cost and authentication success rate for the proposed GD2C protocols.
A. Comparison on Security Properties
We compare the security properties of the proposed protocols with SeDS [19] and a light-weight D2D-assist data transmission protocol (LSD) [20] as shown in Table III . For mutual authentication, in SeDS, the message sent by eNB in step 5 can be replayed without being checked out. For end-to-end security, LDS only claims to be achieved by DH key agreement and does not concrete in the protocol. For network-absent secure D2D communication, only the proposed NA-GD2C provides. Besides that, only the proposed protocol can achieve both identity and group anonymity.
B. Computation and Communication Costs
In this section, we evaluate the computation/communication costs of the proposed schemes empirically on a smartphone of HTC One X as a testbed. The smartphone runs Android 4.1.1 mobile operating system and is equipped with 1.5 GHz quad-core ARM Cortex-A9 CPU and 1GB RAM. The cryptographic libraries for the implementation are java pairing based cryptography (JPBC) [40] and Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) [41] . Table II shows the total computation cost (time) and the message length of the proposed two schemes, and the definitions of related computation times. Regarding the message length, we build the pairing mapping by MNT curves [42] for 80 bits security, where the length of an element from G 1 is 170 bits and from G T is 340 bits. For storage cost, it only takes 682-bit in total on every UE i , where (128 × 4) bits for (ID i , AID i , K i , AK i ) and 170 bits for d ID i .
C. Authentication Success Rate of D2D Communications
In this section, we analyze the authentication success rate (ASR) of the proposed protocols to evaluate their feasibility. The measurement of ASR considers the effects of the arrival rate of D2D authentication requests and the residence time of a host device in eNB and that in the coverage of D2D communications (i.e., the time that both devices are in the D2D communication coverage of each other) affect the ASR. For convenience, we name a device that initiates D2D communication as a host device and a device that is the counterpart of the host device, as a target device.
In the authentication process, the host device will reserve its resource for authentication (e.g., CPU) for each incoming device in first-come-first-serve (FCFS) manner. The authentication fails whenever the target device departs from the coverage of D2D communication or one of the host and target devices departs from the coverage of eNB in network-covered case, before finishing authentication of the target device at the host device.
We denote the residence time of a host device in the D2D communication coverage of a target device as t rd , and the residence time of the host device in eNB 2 as t r . The system authentication time is denoted by t a , defined as t a = t Q + t s , where t Q is the waiting time in queue for authentication processing and t s is the authentication processing time. To evaluate the ASR, we give the following assumptions. 1) Every device authenticates only one device at a time.
2) The host device residence time t rd in the coverage of a target device (i.e., the residence time in D2D communication) is exponentially distributed with mean 1/λ rd . 3) The host device residence time t r in the coverage of an eNB is exponentially distributed with mean 1/λ r . 4) The authentication processing time t s is constant asT s . 
5)
The arrival rate of host devices entering the coverage of a given target device follows Poisson random process with mean λ t . Note that in [43] and [44] , the expected session key life time is estimated by observing the probability that the life time of session key is greater than or equal to the residence time in new AP, where the residence time in AP is assumed to be exponentially distributed. Hence, we reasonably assume that the residence time in D2D communication and that in eNB are exponentially distributed. We now analyze the ASRs of both proposed protocols for network-covered and network-absent cases. Note that f X (x) denotes the pdf of random variable X in the following analysis.
1) ASR of NA-GD2C Protocol: The ASR in network-absent D2D communication is mainly affected by t rd and t a , and it is derived as follows.
Lemma 1: The authentication success rate of the proposed NA-GD2C protocol is
Proof: The authentication is successful when the residence time in D2D communication is greater than or equal to the system authentication, which includes the waiting time in queue and the authentication time. Hence, the ASR can be presented as
In (34) , when t rd ≤T s , the probability that t a ≤ t rd is zero since t a = t Q +T s . Hence, the ASR is represented by
In (35) , Pr[t a ≤ t rd |t rd ≥T s ] can be derived as 
where L t Q (s) is the Laplace transform of t Q . Since the interarrival time of the target devices is exponential distributed with mean 1/λ t , from M/G/1 queueing analysis in [45] , L t Q (λ rd ) is given by
where ρ = λ tTs . Since the authentication processing time t s is constant asT s , its Laplace transform is given by
From (36), (37) , and (38), we have
The probability that the residence time of D2D communication is equal to or greater thanT s is given by
By (39) and (40), we finally obtain (33) . Fig. 4 shows the authentication success rate with various t rd with time unit,T s . In this figure, we can first see that our analysis on ASR is similar to the simulation result, which verifies the correctness of the analysis. We then also see that the ASR is more than 0.8 when t rd is 10 times of t a , which means that lower authentication processing time results in higher ASR regarding fixed residence time in D2D communication.
From ( 
We show the ASR as a function of c rd for a given c t = 2. We have that if the system wants to obtain an ASR of at least 80%, c rd should be greater than or equal to 11.091, which is also confirmed by (41) . When the mean interarrival time of device is 2 times of the authentication processing time, the mean residence time of device in D2D communication should be greater than or equal to 11.091 times ofT s . Witĥ T s = 6.826 ms (# of group is 50) as in table II a device can achieve the ASR of more than 80% by serving 146.49 authentication requests per second for 1/λ t ≥ 2T s where the mean residence time of device in D2D communication is greater than or equal to 75.707 ms. This proves that the proposed NA-GD2C protocol is feasible to general D2D communications considering the density of D2D communication users and their mobility [46] .
2) ASR of CN-GD2C Protocool: For the ASR in networkcovered D2D communication, it needs to additionally consider the residence time that one of D2D devices is in the coverage of eNB. In Fig. 2 , UE i and UE j negotiate the parameters for D2D communication and UE i sends a request and its identity to start the authentication. Hence, both UE i and UE j need to reside in the coverage of each other before authentication. Thus, the ASR of CN-GD2C can be derived as follows.
Lemma 2: The authentication success rate of the proposed CN-GD2C protocol is given by R = e −2T s (λ r +λ rd ) 1−λ tTs 2 λ rd λ r λ rd −λ t 1−e −λ rdTs λ r −λ t 1−e −λ rTs . (42) Proof: A successful authentication in CN-GD2C protocol requires that the residence times in D2D communication and eNB should be greater than or equal to the system authentication, including the waiting time in queue and the authentication processing time, for each device. Hence, the ASR can be represented as R = Pr [t a ≤ t rd , t a ≤ t r ] = Pr [t a ≤ t rd ] Pr [t a ≤ t r ] (43) where Pr[t a ≥ t r ] is given by
which is obtained in similar way as (36), (37) , and (38) . From (33) , (43) and (44), we finally obtain
which is equal to (42) . Fig. 4 shows the analytic and simulation results of the ASR for network-covered D2D communications according to t r with time unit,T s . In this figure, we can also see that our analysis on ASR is similar to the simulation result, which verifies the correctness of the analysis.
By equation (42), let the mean residence time of device in D2D communication be c rdTs , the mean interarrival time of device be c tTs , and the mean residence time of device in eNB be c rTs , such that one can estimate the ASR as R = e −2 1 c rd
By equation (45), there are various combinations of 1 λ rd and 1 λ r with fixed 1 λ t = 2T s that make R greater than or equal to 80%. Considering that the range of the communication between devices is stricter than that between eNB and devices, we may select a combination to minimize 1 λ rd guarantee the ASR can be greater than or equal to 80%. To this end, a combination that 1 λ r = 12.915T s , 1 λ rd = 83.022T s , and 1 λ t ≥ 2T s , guarantees the ASR is greater than or equal to 80%. ForT s = 1.5716 ms as in table II, a device can serve at most 636.29 devices per second with 1/λ t = 3.1432 ms. Hence, the proposed CN-GD2C protocol completely satisfy the requirements of D2D communications.
From the above results, we can see that both NA-GD2C and CN-GD2C protocols are adequate for D2D communication regarding performance.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work proposes two group AKE protocol for securing network-covered and network-absent D2D communications with traceability and guaranteeing end-to-end confidentiality to network operators for D2D applications. Specifically, their security can be proven based on the security of pseudorandom function, pseudorandom permutation, IND-CPA IBE, linear encryption, and key-private encryption. Furthermore, the performance analyses show the effect of the computation costs depending on ASRs by using M/G/1 queueing model, which reflects the effects of the residence times in D2D communication and in eNB, the inter-arrival time of devices, and the authentication processing time on the ASR. The communication costs of both protocol are considerably low even the new security properties are provided. Hence, the feasibility and scalability of this work are demonstrated to support efficient secure D2D communication in mobile networks.
